This paper shows how de Finetti's book-making principle, commonly used to justify additive subjective probabilities, can be modi¯ed to agree with some nonexpected utility models. More precisely, a new foundation of the rankdependent models is presented that is based on a comonotonic extension of the book-making principle. The extension excludes book-making only if all gambles considered induce a same rank-ordering of the states of nature through favorableness of their associated outcomes, and allows for nonadditive probabilities. Typical features of rank-dependence, hedging, ambiguity aversion, and pessimism and optimism, can be accommodated.
Introduction
De Finetti's book-making principle entails that a gambler should not endorse preferences that can be linearly combined into a sure loss. A surprising implication is that all uncertainties have to be expressed in terms of additive probabilities, possibly subjective (de Finetti [10, 11, 12] ). The principle has, since its discovery, served as a justi¯cation of Bayesianism. The main restriction of the book-making principle is that it requires outcomes to be expressed in utils, in other words, utility must be linear. This requirement is reasonable for small stakes. Linear combinations of gambles naturally arise in¯nancial markets, where assets can be bought and sold at¯xed rates. The book-making principle then amounts to a no-arbitrage requirement which is commonly accepted as normative in¯nance ( [29] , [44] .
There are many descriptive reasons, and according to some authors also normative reasons, for deviations from Bayesianism. This insight has resulted from the Allais [3] and Ellsberg [15] paradoxes and has led to a rich literature ( [7] [39], [41] . The most popular models today are the rank-dependent models (Quiggin [31] , Schmeidler [38] , Tversky & Kahneman [43] , Yaari [49], They allow for nonlinear sensitivity towards uncertainty, modeled through nonadditive measures (capacities). Decision weights of events depend on how favorable the outcomes of the events are in comparison to the alternative outcomes of the gamble under consideration (rank-dependence). Basic rationality requirements such as transitivity and monotonicity are maintained but many other deviations from Bayesianism can be accommodated. Examples are pessimism (aversion to uncertainty and convex capacities), optimism (concave capacities), and insu±cient sensitivity towards uncertainty (inverse-S capacities, overweighting unlikely events and underweighting likely events [43] ).
In¯nancial portfolios, investing in negatively correlated assets (hedging) is desirable. This phenomenon can be modeled by pessimism and convex capacities. Nonlinear sensitivity towards probability also is an important factor underlying insurance.
In [47] it is found that people's common aversion to incomplete insurance cannot be explained by curvature of utility but can be explained by nonlinear probabilities. This paper combines the preceding two developments. That is, we assume utils as outcomes and identify the books that can be made 1 against the rank-dependent models. It is easily seen that books cannot be made whenever the gambles considered are \comonotonic" (same ordering of events according to favorableness of outcomes).
Examples will demonstrate that books must be due to hedging, optimism, and other phenomena that all deal with noncomonotonic gambles. To the degree that such phenomena are descriptively or even normatively desirable, the exclusion of books is unwarranted. This paper studies a comonotonic Dutch book-making principle that does not exclude books unless all acts are comonotonic and thereby does allow for hedging, optimism, ambiguity aversion, etc. We show that such a book-making principle is not only necessary, but also su±cient, for the rank-dependent models, given payment in utils. Hence, a new foundation of the rank-dependent models results.
As a by-product of our analysis we show that the book-making principle is closely related to an additivity condition for preferences that is well-known in decision theory and that has been extensively studied in the mathematics literature. In a mathemat- Gamble f will generate outcome f (s) if s is the true state of nature. Gambles are often identi¯ed with n-tuples and, hence, the set of gambles is identi¯ed with IR n .
Sometimes probabilities of the states are given. Then the state space is a probability space and gambles are random variables. In general, probabilities need not be given.
By < we denote the preference relation of the decision maker over the gambles. It is a weak order if it is complete (f < g or g < f for all gambles f; g) and transitive.
The notation Â and » is as usual. Strict monotonicity holds if f Â g whenever f > g (f > g means that f (s) > g(s) for all states s). For a gamble f , a fair price is an outcome x such that x » f . As usual, outcomes are identi¯ed with constant gambles.
The Dutch book-making principle, also called coherence by de Finetti, is based on the idea that a number of good decisions, when taken together, should be good still.
\Taken together" is interpreted as outcome-wise addition. A Dutch book, de¯ned formally hereafter, consists of a number of preferences that, when taken together, yield a loss for each state of nature. Obviously, such a result is not good and therefore the (Dutch) book-making principle requires that no Dutch book exists.
DEFINITION 1 A (Dutch) book consists of a number of preferences
In words, if replacing g j by f j is good for each j, then the joint result of these replacements should not be a sure loss. Our presentation di®ers from de Finetti's in four respects. First, de Finetti also considers multiplication by positive scalars, where the¯nal condition in De¯nition 1 is replaced by the condition that P n j=1¸j f j (s) < P n j=1¸j g j (s) for some positive¸js. We have dropped such scalar-multiplication because addition seems to be a more natural way of combining gambles than scalarmultiplication and because the required implications can be derived from addition alone. Second, de Finetti considers a game situation where an outside person can take the decision maker up on any of his preferences. We have formulated the condition in a single-person decision making context so as to avoid distortions due to strategic considerations (see de Finetti [11] , footnote (a) in the 1964 translation) and the state of information of the outside person.
Third, as will be demonstrated in Theorem 2, the book-making principle is based on two principles, strict monotonicity and additivity (f < g implies f + h < g + h for all gambles f; g; h). In his discussions, de Finetti emphasized monotonicity but we, as many other authors, think that the essence of the book-making principle lies in additivity ( [7] p. 359 second full paragraph, [36] ). For moderate stakes, additivity seems a reasonable condition. The receipt of act h does not change the situation or needs of the decision maker much and, hence, it seems reasonable that the preference between f and g is not a®ected.
Fourth, de Finetti did not invoke a completeness requirement imposed on all gambles but instead he took an arbitrary set of gambles and their fair prices as the initial domain of preference. Because all linear combinations were incorporated also, his domain was a linear subspace on which, through the fair prices, a weak order was obtained. The extension of the following result to linear subspaces is omitted for simplicity of the presentation.
THEOREM 2
The following three statements are equivalent for < on IR n .
(i) There exist probabilities p 1 ; :::; p n such that preferences maximize expected
(ii) < is a weak order, for each gamble there exists a fair price, and no Dutch book can be made.
(iii) < is a weak order, for each gamble there exists a fair price, and additivity and strict monotonicity are satis¯ed.
¤
We end this section with some comments on related mathematical results. There are many results similar to the equivalence of (i) and (iii) with continuity instead of the fair price condition and with an invariance condition for scalar multiplication In the third example, adding (1 + ²; 0; 1 + ²; 0) and (0; 1 + ²; 0; 1 + ²) removes the uncertainty about the unknown probabilities of the outcomes.
In each example, variability of one gamble is tempered by counter-variability of the other one. The mentioned interaction e®ects do not arise when the gambles added are \comonotonic." A set of gambles is comonotonic if for each pair of elements f; g there do not exist states s; t such that f (s) > f (t) and g(s) < g(t).
We next introduce a generalization of the book-making principle suggested by the preceding considerations. A comonotonic (Dutch) book is a book as in De¯nition 1
with the extra restriction that the set of gambles considered (ff 1 ; : : : ; f n ; g 1 ; : : : ; g n g)
is comonotonic. The comonotonic (Dutch) book-making principle requires that no comonotonic Dutch book exists. Similarly, comonotonic additivity means that f < g implies f + h < g + h for all comonotonic gambles f; g; h.
We next de¯ne Choquet expected value, the model characterized by the comono- 
represents <, where the decision weights ¼ j are de¯ned as follows. First, a permuta- (1) ). The decision weights are non-negative and sum to one.
THEOREM 6
The following three statements are equivalent for the preference relation < on IR n .
(i) There exists a capacity W such that preferences maximize Choquet expected value.
(ii) The binary relation < is a weak order, for each gamble there exists a fair price, and no comonotonic Dutch book can be made.
(iii) The binary relation < is a weak order, for each gamble there exists a fair price, and comonotonic additivity and strict monotonicity are satis¯ed.
¤
The risk seeking in Example 3 can be explained by a capacity W assigning a weight exceeding 1=36 to each number. This capacity implies an overweighting of unlikely events and risk seeking for long-shot options. In Example 4, hedging can be explained by a capacity W with W (Heads) = W (T ails) < :45. This choice yields a decision weight of less than :45 for the 20 outcome and a decision weight exceeding :55 for the zero outcome. Consequently, the observed risk aversion is not ascribed to diminishing marginal utility as this was traditionally done, but it is ascribed to the extra attention paid to the zero outcome. The aversion to unknown probabilities in Example 5 can be explained by any capacity W assigning a greater value to the events fB k B a ; B k R a g and fR k B a ; R k R a g, describing the colors from the known urn K than to the events fB k B a ; R k B a g and fB k R a ; R k R a g, describing the colors from the unknown urn A.
We end this section with some comments on related mathematical results. There have been several variations on Statement (iii) in the literature. [13] used comonotonic additivity together with continuity but without any monotonicity to characterize a nonmonotonic generalization of CEV. Already Schmeidler [37] used a comonotonic additivity condition for functionals, in combination with continuity, to characterize noncomonotonic CEV functionals; he also characterized the monotonic case. The latter case is also characterized in [22] . Schmeidler's [38] comonotonic mixture-invariance condition for preferences is famous. It was used to obtain linearity with respect to second-stage probabilities. Chateauneuf ([9] , Theorem 1) generalized Schmeidler's preference condition, considering mixtures of outcomes rather than of probabilities.
Discussion
The book-making principle relies on linear utility. Linear utility is reasonable for moderate amounts of money ( [14] , [17] , [25] p. 290, [26] p. 86, [32] p. 176, [34] p. 91).
In fact, the rank-dependent model suggests that much of the deviations from expected value observed for moderate amounts of money, and traditionally ascribed to curvature of utility, is due to nonlinear sensitivity towards probability. This suggestion is supported empirically by Selten, Sadrieh, & Abbing [40] . They compared nonlinearity of outcome sensitivity with nonlinearity of sensitivity towards probability. For the small outcomes considered (ranging between ¡$1 and $3), nonlinear sensitivity towards probability was more pronounced.
Our model can be interpreted as a return to [30] . That paper, one of the earliest empirical studies of risk attitude, already used nonlinear probabilities rather than nonlinear utilities to explain the deviations from expected value. Yaari [49] also assumed linear utility in his derivation of rank-dependent utility for risk and our model can be considered the generalization of Yaari's model to uncertainty.
Many studies into the nature of nonadditive probabilities are going on today. If both utilities and probability weights are unknown, complex measurement methods have to be invoked ( [1] , [6] , [21] , [43] . We suggest that linear utility is a good approximation for moderate stakes and, hence, that gambles with moderate stakes provide an easy tool for measuring nonlinear probability weighting ( [23] ; Diecidue, Wakker, & Zeelenberg, in preparation).
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2. The implication (i) ) (ii) follows from substitution.
Next we assume (ii) and derive (iii). For strict monotonicity, assume that f < g and f (s) < g(s) for all s. The preferences immediately entail a Dutch book and, hence, a contradiction. Strict monotonicity follows. For each gamble f , de¯ne F P (f )
as the fair price of gamble f . F P is uniquely determined and represents preference (f < g if and only if F P (f ) > F P (g); note that x > y implies x y because of strict monotonicity). We claim that F P satis¯es additivity (F P (f + g) = F P (f ) + F P (g), also known as Cauchy's functional equation). To wit, if
results and, hence, a contradiction. If F P (f + g) > F P (f ) + F P (g) then the reversed preferences result in a Dutch book. Additivity of F P follows. Additivity of F P implies additivity of <; hence, Statement (iii) follows.
We¯nally assume (iii) and derive (i). F P is de¯ned as above and represents preference. We again derive additivity of F P . f » F P (f ) implies, by two-fold application of additivity (with < and with 4), that f + g » F P (f ) + g. Additivity and g » F P (g) imply that g + F P (f ) » F P (g) + F P (f ). Transitivity implies that
Additivity means that Cauchy's functional equation holds which, together with strict monotonicity, implies that F P is a linear functional ([2] Theorem 2.1.1.1).
F P (f ) = P n j=1 p j f (s j ) for real numbers p j . The p j s are nonnegative for if one, say p 1 , were negative then we could¯nd a gamble (M; 1; : : : ; 1) with M so large that the F P of the gamble would be negative, implying that it is less preferred than the 0 gamble, thus violating strict monotonicity. Finally, F P (1) = 1 implies that the p j s sum to one. Statement (i) has been proved. ¤ Proof of Theorem 6. The implication (i) ) (ii) follows from substitution. The implication (ii) ) (iii) is established as in the proof of Theorem 2, with the appropriate comonoticity requirements added; note that constant gambles are comonotonic with all other gambles.
We¯nally assume (iii) and derive (i). That F P is representing and satis¯es comonotonic additivity (F P (f + g) = F P (f ) + F P (g) holds whenever f and g are comonotonic) is demonstrated exactly as in the proof of Theorem 2, again with all ap-propriate comonotonicity requirements added. We¯nally show that F P is a Choquet integral.
For any event E and real¸,¸E denotes¸times the indicator function of E. For any¯xed E,¸7 ! F P (¸E) satis¯es Cauchy's equation on the nonnegative reals. On that set, the mapping is bounded on a nondegenerate interval, i.e., it is bounded above on [0; 1] by F P (2; : : : ; 2). Hence, F P is linear on this set ([2], Theorem 2.1.1.1) and F P (¸E) =¸W (E) for the real number W (E) = F P (1E). W (;) = 0 and W (S) = 1 follow because F P assigns fair prices. W is monotonic with respect to set inclusion: If A ¾ B but W (A) < W (B), then we can¯nd¸su±ciently large to imply F P (¸A + (1; : : : ; 1)) = F P (¸A) + F P (1; : : : ; 1)) < F P (¸B), contradicting strict monotonicity. Hence W is monotonic with respect to set inclusion, which implies that W is nonnegative.
Every gamble can be written as a sum P n j=1¸j E j ¡ (M; : : : ; M) for nonnegativȩ j , nonnegative M , and decreasing sets E 1 ¾ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¾ E n . To wit, in E n the gamble is minimal, its second-smallest value is taken in E n¡1 E n , etc.; if the minimal value is negative then M is taken positive so as to have¸n nonnegative). . By comonotonic additivity, F P ( P n j=1¸j E j ¡ (M; : : : ; M )) = P n j=1 F P (¸jE j ) ¡ F P (M; : : : ; M)) = P n j=1¸j W (E j )¡M which is the CEV value of the gamble with respect to the capacity W . ¤
